

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X (w/o atts)		
2	DDCI				
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5	DDI		X (w/o atts)		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X (w/o atts)		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
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12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
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15	VC/NIC	X (w/o atts)			
16	NIO/AF		X (w/atts)		
17	D/ALA/DI		X (w/atts)		
18	C/AF/DO		X (w/atts)		
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SUSPENSE		<div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 19 June 85 Date </div>			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

7 June 85

Date

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Executive Registry

85- 2412

17 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Southern Africa


I want talking points on the attached material to take up with McFarlane on Thursday, together with any relevant intelligence or insights which John Helgerson and may be able to provide.

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William J. Casey

Attachments:



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CIA - EYES ONLY DCI & NIO - ADDED PER NPLATT S/S. 6/13/85

- F. Wettersing

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FROM EMBASSY CAPE TOWN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PNAT, PGOV, MOPS, SF, AO, US
SUBJECT: SAG'S REPLY TO 'SYNTHESIS'

1. (S) ON SHORT NOTICE EVENING JUNE 12, FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA SUMMONED DCM TO RECEIVE SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE TO OUR SYNTHESIS PAPER. (AMBASSADOR WAS UNABLE TO EXTRICATE HIMSELF FROM A CONCURRENT SPEAKING COMMITMENT). ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF, DCM WAS USHERED INTO PIK'S OFFICE WHERE THE MINISTER HANDED HIM AN 11-PAGE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES 'SYNTHESIS' ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA." PIK SHRUGGED AND SAID THAT HE HAD NOTHING MORE TO ADD; THE DOCUMENT STOOD BY ITSELF. HE DECLINED TO VERBALLY SUMMARIZE ITS CONTENTS. LESS THAN A MINUTE AFTER SITTING DOWN, HE STOOD, SMILED AND BADE HIS VISITORS FAREWELL. DFA DIRECTOR GENERAL RAE KILLEN, DFA SOUTH WEST AFRICA OFFICE DIRECTOR DAVE STEWARD AND MINISTERIAL ASSISTANT PIERRE DIETRICHSEN WERE PRESENT.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE BEGINS BY EXPRESSING ITS "DEEP CONCERN" OVER THE "CLEAR DEVIATIONS" IN THE U.S. POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. IT GIVES NUMEROUS

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EXAMPLES OF PREVIOUS USG INSISTENCE ON "SIMULTANEOUS" CTW AND SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE REDUCTION IN NAMIBIA UNDER UNSCR 435. THE DOCUMENT ALSO REITERATES THE SAG'S UNDERSTANDING WITH THE USG THAT "NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO JEOPARDISE UNITA'S POSITION" AND RELAYS DR. SAVIMBI'S FEARS THAT THE U.S. "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION" WOULD DO JUST THAT.

THE SAG'S SPECIFIC PROPOSALS INCLUDE:

- -- SIX WEEKS AFTER THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435, ALL BUT 24,000 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN. AFTER NINE WEEKS, ALL BUT 16,000 AND AFTER 12 WEEKS, ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF 3,000.
- -- ALL CUBANS WILL MOVE NORTH OF THE 13TH PARALLEL FROM THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435; THE RESIDUAL 3,000 WILL WITHDRAW ABOVE THE 10TH PARALLEL WHERE THEY MAY REMAIN FOR A MAXIMUM OF 24 MONTHS.
- -- SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO WILL CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS, AND SOUTH AFRICA "WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SWAPO TO PURSUE ITS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN THE TERRITORY BY PURELY PEACEFUL MEANS."
- -- SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA WILL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.

2. (S) FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE:

BEGIN TEXT:

SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES "SYNTHESIS" ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA

A. INTRODUCTION

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO PLACE ON RECORD ITS
DEEP CONCERN OVER THE CLEAR DEVIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
"BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS" FROM THE POSITION WHICH THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL
OF CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA.

SOUTH AFRICA'S COOPERATION ON SOUTHWEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA
HAS THROUGHOUT, BEEN BASED INTER ALIA ON A MUTUALLY
PERCEIVED NECESSITY OF COUNTERACTING SOVIET INTERVENTION IN
THE REGION. FROM THE VERY OUTSET OF ITS DISCUSSIONS WITH
THE CURRENT UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION, THE WITHDRAWAL OF
CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA HAS BEEN A PRIME OBJECTIVE OF BOTH
COUNTRIES. ONE OF THE ELEVEN POINTS SUBMITTED TO SECRETARY
OF STATE HAIG BY FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA ON 14 MAY 1981 WAS
- "THE REMOVAL OF MILITARY FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
- AND ITS SURROGATES FROM THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION".
-

AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE THE SAME DAY SECRETARY OF STATE
HAIG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENT:

- "I THINK WE HAVE STATED WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT THERE
- IS AN EMPIRICAL INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
- SITUATION IN ANGOLA AND ... NAMIBIA."
-

DURING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, WILLIAM P. CLARK'S VISIT
TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM 10-13 JUNE 1981, THE CUBAN PRESENCE
IN ANGOLA BECAME THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE DISCUSSIONS.

HE STATED, INTER ALIA, THAT

- "THE PRESENCE OF THESE FOREIGN TROOPS ON AFRICAN SOIL
- WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES ...
- (WHICH) PROPOSED TO TAKE SEVERE ACTION BEFORE THE END
- OF THE YEAR TO GET THE CUBANS OUT."
-

INDEED, THE UNITED STATES INDICATED THAT IT WOULD FORCE THE

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CUBAN SERPENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TAIL FROM ANGOLA BY TAKING
ACTION AGAINST ITS HEAD.

DURING DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CLARK'S VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA AN IMPASSE DEVELOPED ON 11 JUNE 1981 CONCERNING THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF UNTAG UNDER THE TERMS ENVISAGED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT OF 29 AUGUST 1978. AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION ON 21 APRIL 1981 NOT TO ALLOW A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DTA TO ADDRESS IT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIS PRIVILEGE HAD BEEN ACCORDED TO SWAPO, THE DTA LOST ALL FAITH IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ABILITY TO BE INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 IN AN IMPARTIAL MANNER. IT ACCORDINGLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THAT ANY UN FORCES ("BLUE HELMETS") COULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE TERRITORY DURING THE PROPOSED TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE HOLDING OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN THE TERRITORY ONCE SOUTH AFRICA'S FORCES HAD BEEN REDUCED TO 1,500 IN TERMS OF THE UN PLAN. WHILE LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN FORCES WOULD STILL BE DEPLOYED ACROSS THE BORDER IN ANGOLA, THE UNITED STATES AGREED WITH SOUTH AFRICA AT THE TIME THAT THIS WOULD GIVE SWAPO A STRONG PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES SOUTH AFRICA SUPPORTED THE DTA'S VIEW THAT NO UN FORCES SHOULD BE ALLOWED IN THE TERRITORY BUT AGREED TO ACCEPT MILITARY CONTINGENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE UNIFORMS OF THEIR DEFENCE FORCES.

IT WAS AT THIS POINT, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THIS DEADLOCK, THAT MR. ELLIOT ABRAMS, A MEMBER OF THE OFFICIAL US DELEGATION, ASKED MINISTER BOTHA IF THE SITUATION WOULD CHANGE IN THE EVENT THAT THE CUBANS WERE

WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA, TO WHICH THE MINISTER IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BRING ABOUT A COMPLETELY NEW SITUATION.

IN A FURTHER REACTION TO THIS DEVELOPMENT MINISTER BOTHA

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PRESENTED MR. CLARK IN WINDHOEK THE NEXT DAY, 12 JUNE 1981
WITH SIX POINTS IN WHICH HE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES'

- "AFFIRMATION THAT THE CUBANS MUST AND SHALL LEAVE
- SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE UNDERSTAND THAT STEPS TO BRING
- THIS ABOUT WILL BE INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE."

THIS FIRM UNDERSTANDING FORMED THE BASIS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN UNTAG ELEMENT IN
SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ACCORDINGLY RESOLVED THE IMPASSE IN
THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES
IN JUNE 1981.

DURING THE COURSE OF ITS DISCUSSIONS OVER MORE THAN FOUR
YEARS WITH THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA HAS CONSISTENTLY
REQUIRED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FIRM AGREEMENT ON THE WITH-
DRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA PRIOR TO THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF RESOLUTION 435. IT REPEATEDLY SPELLED OUT ITS
INSISTENCE THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A
SIMULTANEOUS AND PARALLEL BASIS WITH THE REDUCTION OF ITS
OWN FORCES IN TERMS OF UNSCR 435. THUS, IN FOREIGN
MINISTER BOTHA'S LETTER TO SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ ON
3 SEPTEMBER 1982 HE WROTE

- "YOU WILL RECALL THAT IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE
- CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE PLACE CONCURRENTLY WITH THE
- REDUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN SWA/NAMIBIA. THE
- LAST CUBANS WILL THEREFORE HAVE TO LEAVE ANGOLA AT THE
- TIME THE SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ARE REDUCED TO THE
- MINIMUM FORESEEN IN THE SETTLEMENT PLAN--I.E. 12 WEEKS
- AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION. AS YOU

- KNOW, THE SETTLEMENT PLAN PROVIDES FOR A REDUCTION
- AND NOT A WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES."

AT NO TIME DID THE UNITED STATES CONTRADICT THIS POSITION.
ON THE CONTRARY IN STATEMENT AFTER STATEMENT IT EXPRESSED

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THE VIEW THAT CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA AND THE
REDUCTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA

SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A SIMULTANEOUS BASIS.

THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, ON 5 JULY 1981 SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG
INFORMED MINISTER BOTHA THAT ONCE SOUTH AFRICA HAD PROVIDED
THE UNITED STATES WITH A DATE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SETTLEMENT PLAN

- "WE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO USE THAT DATE TO SEEK A
- SPECIFIC COMMITMENT TO A SCHEDULE FOR CUBAN TROOP
- WITHDRAWAL COORDINATED WITH THE TRANSITIONAL SECURITY
- ARRANGEMENTS IN NAMIBIA. OUR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE
- PHASED WITHDRAWALS COORDINATED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF
- UNTAG AND THE DRAWDOWN OF YOUR FORCES AS PROVIDED IN
- THE UN PLAN."

IN A FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS ON 9 MAY 1982 PRESIDENT REAGAN
NOTED THAT

- "THE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES FROM
- ANGOLA IS ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVING NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.
- AS WELL AS CREATING LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN
- THE REGION."

ON 14 MAY 1982 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE CROCKER STATED
THAT

- WE HAVE BEEN CLEAR IN EXPRESSING THE BELIEF THAT A
- SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN
- FORCES IS NECESSARY IF THERE IS TO BE AN OVERALL
- SETTLEMENT."

ON 21 MAY 1982 SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG AGAIN INFORMED
MINISTER BOTHA THAT HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS COLLEAGUES

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ON 29 AUGUST 1982 SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ REPEATED THE POSITION OF HIS PREDECESSOR:

- "I WANT TO STATE ... AGAIN CLEARLY ... OUR POSITION ON
- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND
- THE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS.

- IT IS THAT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA MUST
- TAKE PLACE PARALLEL WITH PHASE III OF THE NAMIBIA
- PROCESS, WHICH INCLUDES WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN
- FORCES FROM NAMIBIA."

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WAS ACCORDINGLY SHOCKED ON 21 MARCH 1985 WHEN DR. CROCKER PRESENTED IT WITH A "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS" IN TERMS OF WHICH ALL OF THE CUBAN FORCES COULD STILL BE IN ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE PROPOSED ELECTION IN SWA/NAMIBIA IN TERMS OF RESOLUTION 435. BY WHICH TIME ITS OWN FORCES IN THE TERRITORY WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO 1,500. IN ADDITION, 6 000 CUBANS WOULD BE ABLE TO REMAIN IN ANGOLA FOR UP TO 24 MONTHS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435.

IN TERMS OF THIS FORMULA CUBAN FORCES WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE ELECTION IN SWA AND ONE OF THE

MAIN REASONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S INSISTENCE ON THEIR WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE NEGATED. THE US PROPOSAL WOULD ALSO DEPRIVE SOUTH AFRICA OF ITS ONLY CONCRETE GUARANTEE THAT THE CUBANS WOULD, INDEED, BE WITHDRAWN. NAMELY THAT IF THEY INTERRUPTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES FROM ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA WOULD CEASE THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES IN SWA/NAMIBIA. THE US SUGGESTION THAT THE PROCESS COULD BE VERIFIED BY UN OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA PROVIDES NO GUARANTEE

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WHATSOEVER THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD HONOUR THEIR COMMIT-
MENTS.

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ANOTHER CENTRAL ELEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA'S UNDERSTANDING
WITH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE
DONE TO JEOPARDIZE UNITA'S POSITION. ONE OF THE SIX
PRINCIPLES WHICH MINISTER BOTHA CONVEYED TO DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF STATE CLARK ON 12 JUNE 1981 STIPULATED THAT

- "IT IS ACCEPTED THAT SAVIMBI WILL BE ASSISTED
- APPROPRIATELY. FURTHERMORE SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD NOT BE
- FORCED OUT OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA IN SUCH A WAY THAT

- SAVIMBI CANNOT BE ASSISTED."

HOWEVER, SOUTH AFRICA UNDERSTANDS THAT DR. SAVIMBI IS OF
THE OPINION THAT THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED STATES'
"BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS" WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE UNITA'S
POSITION. HE FEARS THAT IF SWAPO WERE TO WIN THE UN-SUPER-
VISED ELECTION UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE VAST MAJORITY
OF THE CUBAN FORCES WOULD STILL BE IN ANGOLA, ITS MPLA
ALLIES WOULD, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, BE ABLE TO ATTACK HIM FROM
THE REAR THROUGH SOUTHWEST AFRICA. IN OTHER WORDS, SOUTH
WEST AFRICA WOULD THEN BECOME A STAGING GROUND FOR ATTACKS
AGAINST UNITA'S MAIN BASES.

SOUTH AFRICA IS AWARE OF THE EXTREME PRESSURE TO WHICH THE
US ADMINISTRATION IS BEING SUBJECTED OVER ITS POLICY TOWARD
SOUTHERN AFRICA. IT CAN UNDERSTAND THE US WISH TO ACHIEVE
AN ACCELERATED AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, IT
HOPES THAT IN THE UNITED STATES' HASTE TO REMOVE THE
TROUBLESOME QUESTION OF SWA/NAMIBIA FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA, IT WILL NOT AGREE TO A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON
CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE CONFIRMATION IN
POWER OF THE UNELECTED MARXIST-LENINIST MPLA IN LUANDA,
AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN A LARGE PART OF
SOUTHERN AFRICA. IMPORTANT AFRICAN LEADERS SHARE SOUTH

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AFRICA'S CONCERNS IN THIS REGARD. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL BE IMPLEMENTED IT COULD LEAD TO A LARGE SCALE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA AND ALL THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

B. UNITED STATES "SYNTHESIS"

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE UNITED STATES DOCUMENT TITLED "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS". ITS FOLLOWING RESPONSE TO THESE POINTS REPRESENTS THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR A FIRM AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE RSA.

1. WITH A VIEW TO MAINTAINING STABILITY ALONG THE SWA/
- ANGOLAN BORDER, AND FOLLOWING THE DISENGAGEMENT OF
- SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA, ALL SIDES
- REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO CARRYING OUT THE
- PRINCIPLES OF THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT.
2. SOUTH AFRICA WILL INFORM THE UNITED NATIONS
- SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IT WILL IMPLEMENT UNSCR 435 IN
- SWA/NAMIBIA, AND REDUCE ITS FORCES FROM SWA/NAMIBIA
- FOLLOWING THE TIMETABLE ANNEXED TO UNSCR 435, ON
- CONDITION THAT ANGOLA COMPLIES WITH THE PRESENT AGREE-
- MENT, AND ON CONDITION THAT THE CUBANS WHO WITHDRAW
- FROM ANGOLA, WILL NOT BE REPLACED BY OTHER HOSTILE
- FORCES AND WILL NOT BE REDEPLOYED ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA
- WHERE THEIR PRESENCE MAY PRESENT A THREAT TO SOUTHERN
- AFRICA. ALL PARTIES WILL DO THEIR UTMOST TO ASSURE
- THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS PROCEEDS IN AN ORDERLY
- AND PEACEFUL MANNER AND THAT THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS
- IMPLEMENTED IN A BONA FIDE MANNER. THE RETENTION OF
- SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CUBANS UNDER THE GUISE OF THEIR

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- HAVING OBTAINED ANGOLAN CITIZENSHIP WILL BE UNACCEPT-
- ABLE.
- 3. SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO WILL INFORM THE UNSG THAT THEY
- WILL CEASE ALL HOSTILE ACTS AS SOON AS THIS AGREEMENT
- HAS BEEN CONCLUDED. SWAPO WILL AT THE SAME TIME CEASE
- ALL ACTS OF COERCION AND INTIMIDATION AGAINST THE
- PEOPLE OF SOUTHWEST AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA WILL MAKE
- IT POSSIBLE FOR SWAPO TO PURSUE ITS POLITICAL
- OBJECTIVES IN THE TERRITORY BY PURELY PEACEFUL MEANS.
- THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO FROM
- DECLARING AT ANY MOMENT A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
- BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF THIS AGREEMENT.
- 4. SOUTH AFRICA GIVES ITS SOLEMN ASSURANCE TO ANGOLA
- THAT DURING AND AFTER THE NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE
- PROCESS, IT WILL RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND
- SOVEREIGNTY OF ANGOLA AND WILL NOT PERMIT ITS
- TERRITORY, OR TERRITORY UNDER ITS CONTROL, TO BE USED
- FOR THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE DIRECTED AGAINST THE
- TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR SOVEREIGNTY OF ANGOLA ON

- CONDITION THAT ANGOLA WILL RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL

- INTEGRITY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA AND WILL NOT
- PERMIT ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR THREATS OR ACTS OF
- FORCE, OR PREPARATIONS FOR ACTS OF FORCE DIRECTED
- AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
- SWA/NAMIBIA DURING AND AFTER THE SWA/NAMIBIA
- INDEPENDENCE PROCESS.
- 5. THE RSA AND ANGOLA AGREE THAT THE REDUCTION OF SA
- FORCES FROM SWA/NAMIBIA AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
- CUBANS, INCLUDING PARA-MILITARY ELEMENTS FROM ANGOLA
- WILL OCCUR ON A PARALLEL AND SIMULTANEOUS BASIS, IN
- SUCH A MANNER THAT SIX WEEKS FROM THE DATE OF THE
- IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF
- 24,000 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM ANGOLA; AFTER

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- NINE WEEKS ALL BUT A MAXIMUM OF 16,000 CUBANS WILL
 - HAVE WITHDRAWN: AND AFTER TWELVE WEEKS ALL BUT A
 - MAXIMUM OF 3,000 CUBANS WILL HAVE WITHDRAWN.
6. ALL CUBANS WILL BE WITHDRAWN ABOVE THE 13TH PARALLEL
- FROM THE DATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435.
 - THE RESIDUAL 3,000 CUBANS WHO MAY REMAIN IN ANGOLA
 - AFTER THE 12TH WEEK FROM THE START OF IMPLEMENTATION
 - OF UNSCR 435 WILL BY THAT TIME WITHDRAW NORTH OF THE
 - 10TH PARALLEL OF SOUTHERN LATITUDE WHERE THEY MAY
 - REMAIN FOR 24 MONTHS AFTER THE START OF IMPLEMENTATION
 - OF UNSCR 435.
7. AFTER THE BEGINNING OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435
- CUBAN FORCES STATIONED IN ANGOLA WILL BE ASSIGNED TO
 - GARRISONS AND THEIR MISSION LIMITED TO PERIMETER
 - SECURITY SUPPLY, AND TRAINING OPERATIONS.
8. VERIFICATION OF THIS PROCESS WILL BE ASSISTED BY A
- LIMITED NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS IN ANGOLA AS
- DESIGNATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL AND
- AGREED TO BY SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA. THESE OBSERVERS
- WILL CONFIRM DEPARTURES OF THE CUBANS AND INVESTIGATE
- COMPLAINTS.
9. THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WILL PASS A
- RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 435; THAT RESOLUTION
 - WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN
 - ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-
 - GENERAL AND SWAPO, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND
 - SOUTH AFRICA, AND BETWEEN THE USA, THE CONTACT GROUP
 - AND SOUTH AFRICA ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 AND
 - THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA. THESE AGREEMENTS MUST BE
 - MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PARTIES INVOLVED AND MUST BE
 - APPROVED BY THEM FOR INCLUSION IN THE SAID UNSC
 - RESOLUTION, BEFOREHAND. AS A RESULT OF THE SECURITY

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- COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION. THE UNITED NATIONS
- SECURITY COUNCIL WILL GUARANTEE RESPECT OF THESE
- COMMITMENTS. WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE A SINGLE BINDING
- ACCORD.

END TEXT. NICKEL

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, SF, UR, US, WA, XA, XJ

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. (S ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN SEVEN HOURS OF TALKS, SOVIET DELEGATION LEADER VASEV AND I FRANKLY ASSESSED THE DIPLOMATIC STATE OF PLAY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WHILE CONCEDED NOTHING ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET POSITIONS, VASEV CAME PREPARED FOR SOME INTERESTING GIVE-AND-TAKE, PARTICULARLY IN A TWO-HOUR ONE-ON-ONE AT THE END OF THE DAY. WHILE UNWILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, VASEV PROVED WILLING TO ENGAGE IN AN EX-CHANGE ON POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLES. THE MEETING PROVIDED A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE OUR CONFIDENCE THAT WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK, AND PERHAPS TO REINFORCE SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT THE DURABILITY OF THEIR POSITION IN THE REGION. ON THIS BASIS, I BELIEVE THE MEETING ACCOMPLISHED THE OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT. END SUMMARY.

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3. AS YOU AND GROMYKO HAD AGREED VASEV AND I MET FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN HOURS ON MAY 30. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY TWO STAFFERS FROM HIS THIRD AFRICAN DEPARTMENT AND AN OFFICER FROM THE MFA'S USA DIVISION. WITH ME WERE AF/S DIRECTOR GELBARD, AF LEGAL ADVISOR ELY, EUR/SOV OFFICER TEFET, EMBASSY PARIS AFRICA WATCHER CHESHES, EMBASSY MOSCOW OFFICER NAPPER, AND TRANSLATOR ZARECHNAK. THE MEETING WAS DIVIDED INTO THREE SEGMENTS: A MORNING SET-PIECE EXCHANGE, A LUNCHEON FOR BOTH DELEGATIONS, AND ALMOST TWO HOURS OF PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN VASEV AND ME TO CLOSE OUT THE DAY. THIS WAS THE FIRST OF MY FOUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IN WHICH MY INTERLOCUTOR MADE A REAL EFFORT TO HAVE THE KIND OF UNSTRUCTURED PRIVATE DISCUSSION IN WHICH GIVE-AND-TAKE IS POSSIBLE.

4. FROM THE OUTSET, VASEV SEEMED INTENT ON A SERIOUS EXCHANGE RATHER THAN SIMPLY A STERILE REHASH OF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS. HE OFFERED TO CONDUCT THE ENTIRE MEETING IN ENGLISH, THUS DOUBLING THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION. VASEV BROUGHT A BRIEF PREPARED PAPER AND REFERRED TO IT OCCASIONALLY, BUT DID NOT READ FROM IT AT LENGTH AS IL'YCHEV HAD IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HE SEEMED IN COMMAND OF HIS MATERIAL, DID NOT HESITATE TO SPEAK FRANKLY AND AT TIMES (PARTICULARLY IN THE MORNING FORMAL SESSION) RESORTED TO SOME PRETTY TOUGH AND OBJECTIONABLE DISTORTIONS OF OUR POSITIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, I DIDN'T FEEL THAT HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THE MEETING WAS TO SCORE DEBATING POINTS. RATHER IT SEEMED THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND PARTICULARLY IN GAUGING OUR SELF-CONFIDENCE ABOUT OUR SOUTHERN AFRICAN DIPLOMACY. HE CONCEDED NOTHING

ON THE SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET POSITIONS, AND UNDERLINED THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE SOVIET SUPPORT AS LONG AS WE

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PROCEED ON THE COURSE ON WHICH WE HAVE SET OUT. THAT
SAID, THE EXCHANGE WAS MORE INTERESTING THAN PREVIOUS
MEETINGS OF ITS KIND, AND AT TIMES HIGHLIGHTED WHAT AP-
PEARED TO BE SERIOUS SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THEIR POSI-
TION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. FOR THIS REASON ALONE, I THINK
THE MEETING ACHIEVED THE OBJECTIVES WE SET FOR IT.

THE MORNING SESSION

5. IN MY OPENING STATEMENT I RESTATED OUR BASIC OBJEC-
TIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: GREATER STABILITY FOR EVERY
NATION; INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA ON THE BASIS OF SECU-
RITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435; REMOVAL OF FOREIGN FORCES; AND
A CLIMATE WHICH WILL PROMOTE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ECONO-
MIC DEVELOPMENT AND MOVEMENT TOWARD A MORE JUST SOCIETY
IN SOUTH AFRICA ENDING A SYSTEM OF LEGALLY ENTRENCHED
RACISM. IN OUR CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS, ALL PARTIES HAD
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT,
INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE FOR NAMIBIA AND CUBANTROOP WITH-
DRAWAL. THE NATIONS OF THE REGION WERE NOW GRAPPLING WITH
QUESTIONS FUNDAMENTAL TO THEIR SECURITY. I EXPRESSED
CONFIDENCE IN OUR APPROACH, SAYING WE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE
WHICH PROVIDES FOR A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT IN THE
REGION.

6. IN HIS 45-MINUTE REPLY, VASEV RESTATED FAMILIAR
SOVIET POSITIONS, MAKING THE FOLLOWING NOTABLE POINTS:

-- THE US SHOULD NOT "APPEASE" SOUTH AFRICA.
THE US SHOULD NOT LINK A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT TO CUBAN
TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY ON
IMPLEMENTING SCRES. 435.

-- THE USSR BELIEVED THE ANGOLAN PACKAGE POSITION
WAS A "REALISTIC PROPOSAL" FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE



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SITUATION IN AND AROUND ANGOLA.

-- SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE HAD MEETINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICAN OFFICIALS PRIMARILY AT THE UN. IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS CLAIMED "REGIONAL SUPERPOWER" STATUS. THE SOVIETS REJECTED THIS ASSERTION.

7. IN OUR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION I TRIED TO ZERO IN ON THE CONTRADICTIONS INHERENT IN VASEV'S STATEMENT THAT THE USSR SUPPORTS THE ANGOLA PACKAGE AND AT THE SAME TIME WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD SEPARATELY WITH A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. WITH INCREASING DISCOMFORT, VASEV TRIED TO RATIONALIZE WHAT ARE CLEARLY CONTINUING DIFFERENCES WITH THE ANGOLANS ON THE LINKAGE ISSUE. HE ADMITTED CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SOVIET POSITION, BUT CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD OBJECT TO ANY PACKAGE WHICH "DOWNGRADES" THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT ISSUE. HE MADE A REPEATED PITCH FOR "CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION" WITH THE US ON SOUTHERN AFRICA BUT WOULD NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC MEASURES TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL, EXCEPT TO PROCEED WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF RES. 435. OBVIOUSLY WITH HIS DEBRIEFING OF THE ANGOLANS IN MIND, HE URGED THAT WE NOT PRESS THE ANGOLANS TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS AND INSTEAD FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRICAN FAILURE TO MOVE FORWARD. VASEV ALSO SEVERAL TIMES STATED THAT MOSCOW CONSIDERED "CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION" IN THE REGION COULD HAVE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON OTHER BROADER ISSUES.

THE ONE-ON-ONE

8. THE MOST INTERESTING AND PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE IN THE ONE-ON-ONE FOLLOWING LUNCH. AS WE SAT IN THE RESIDENCE OVER COFFEE AND WALKED IN THE GARDEN OF THE RESIDENCE, VASEY RETURNED TO SOME OF THE

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MORNING TOPICS AND TOUCHED ON SOME SENSITIVE AREAS WHICH
HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE IN ADDRESSING
BEFORE NOTETAKERS:

- -- ANGOLAN RESPONSE TO OUR SETTLEMENT IDEAS: VASEV
PREDICTED THAT THE ANGOLANS WOULD NOT RESPOND DEFINITELY
TO OUR IDEAS UNTIL THEY KNOW MORE ABOUT HOW SOUTH AFRICA
WOULD RESPOND. MORE NUANCED THAN THE USUAL SOVIET ASSER-
TION THAT THE ANGOLANS WILL GO NO FURTHER. VASEV'S IMPLI-
CIT ACKNOWLEDGMENT THAT THEY MIGHT SEEM TO REINFORCE
THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS MAY NOT HAVE A GOOD FEEL
FOR LUANDA'S BOTTOM LINE.

- -- NATIONAL RECONCILIATION: VASEV ACKNOWLEDGED
THE NEED FOR AN "ETHNIC DIALOGUE" AND EVEN FOR PARTICI-
PATION BY "ELEMENTS" OF UNITA IN THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT.
HE SAID IT WAS A TRAGEDY THAT THERE WERE NO LONGER
OVIMBUNDU (SAVIMBI'S TRIBE) CADRE IN THE MPLA. AND ASSER-
TED THAT ANGOLA'S FUTURE DEPENDED UPON "TRIBAL", NOT
"IDEOLOGICAL" INTEGRATION. I REJECTED HIS CLAIMS THAT
WE HAD SET "UNITA CONDITIONS" AS AN ELEMENT OF OUR
DIPLOMACY. RATHER, I SAID THAT ONLY THE ANGOLANS COULD
RESOLVE THEIR CIVIL WAR, BUT THERE COULD OBVIOUSLY BE NO
PEACE FOR THE COUNTRY UNTIL THEY DID SO.

- -- TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL: AFTER TORTUROUS-
LY TRYING TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE OBJECTIVES
OF "SURVIVAL" OR "SECURITY" FOR THE MPLA REGIME. VASEV
UNEXPECTEDLY PROVED WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A SERIOUS DIS-
CUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. HE

ASSERTED THAT WE HAD SUGGESTED AN EIGHT-MONTH TIMETABLE
FOR WITHDRAWAL OF THE BULK OF CUBAN TROOPS AND THAT SUCH
A SHORT PERIOD OFFERED ANGOLA "NOTHING AT ALL". I
REPLIED THAT THE PERIOD WE HAD SUGGESTED FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF THE BULK OF THE CUBAN TROOPS WAS ONE YEAR AND REITER-
ATED THAT WE REMAINED READY TO NEGOTIATE AND CONFIDENT

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OF OUR APPROACH. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EXCHANGE WAS NOT THAT VASEV OBJECTED TO DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSAL, BUT THAT HE WAS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE AT ALL.

-- VASEV REPEATED EARLIER EFFORTS TO DEFINE "CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION" AS MEANING US AND USSR AGREEMENT ON UN SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA TO AHIFYF SEPAIF IMPCEMENLALLONROF"RES- 435. BUT I MADE CLEAR WE HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING THIS ROUTE. HE DROPPED THIS TIRESOME REFRAIN TOWARD THE END OF OUR EXCHANGE. "I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION CLEARLY." HE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO ARGUE THAT AFRICAN OR DOMESTIC PRESSURES WOULD FORCE OUR HAND. HE DID NOT REJECT MY FORMULATION THAT IT WAS WORTH CONTINUING TO SEEK THE MISSING ELEMENT THAT MIGHT ENABLE THE MPLA TO MOVE FORWARD. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS MIGHT BE EASIER IF THE MPLA ANSWERED THE MAIL AND SPECIFIED ITS CONCERNS.

CONCLUSION

9. JUDGING FROM THE SUBSTANCE AND TENOR OF THE ENTIRE EXCHANGE, THE SOVIETS CLEARLY RECOGNIZE THAT WE RETAIN THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE. WHILE THEY REMAIN UNCONVINCED THAT WE WILL ULTIMATELY SUCCEED, VASEV SEEMED LESS CONFIDENT THAN DID IL'YCHEV IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS THAT MOSCOW

HAS A GOOD HANDLE ON THE DIRECTION AND MOMENTUM OF OUR DIPLOMACY. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, I TOLD VASEV THAT I WOULD BE REPORTING TO YOU, AND WE AGREED TO THINK OVER CAREFULLY WHAT EACH OF US HAD SAID. WHILE MAKING NO COMMITMENT, BOTH OF US AGREED NOT TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN. WE ALSO AGREED TO TAKE A SPARE PRESS LINE, CONFIRMING THAT WE HAD MET AND DISCUSSED THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.

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10. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT EMBASSY, MOSCOW IMMEDIATE.
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